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1.1 Mobile Ad-hoc etworks 
 A Mobile Ad-hoc NETwork (MANET) is a self-configuring network of mobile 
nodes that include routers and hosts connected by wireless links. The union of these 
nodes forms the arbitrary configuration of the network topology. There is no backbone 
for such a topology. Wireless nodes in the network act as routers and deliver data and 
control messages between nodes. If node A cannot directly send a message to node B, 
nodes within range of node A will act as a router for that node and forward the packet to 
the destination. The routers are free to move randomly and organize themselves 
arbitrarily; the network topology changes rapidly and unpredictably. MANET may 
operate in a standalone fashion as for the small organization or it may be connected to a 
larger wired network like the Internet. This arbitrary network topology gives immense 
power to the working of MANETs. These networks can be deployed wherever there is no 
proper backbone for the network. Nodes of MANET can work together and carry out the 
task without the other’s help.  
 MANETS are immensely useful in scenarios where it is not easy to establish 
access points or base receivers and where we need to update the information quickly and 
where maximum mobility is required. For example, in video conferencing, users 
participating in the conference may be geographically distributed. Some of them may not 




examples include military battlefields, disaster relief operations in remote areas, home 
networking as well as for enforcement of law. MANETS can be diagrammatically 
represented as follows. 
 
  
Figure 1.1: MAETS 
 
 Even though, these networks are very flexible and useful in day to day life, there 
are many factors that hinder the development of these networks. One of the main factors 
of concern is security implementation. Users of any networking service demand 
“anywhere, anytime” services. Even if there is a small discontinuation in the service, 
users would lose valuable information. To provide these continued services, the network 
must be free of physical channel errors and it should also prevent break-ins by 
adversaries. Wireless networks like MANETs are susceptible to various types of attacks 
that include snooping to passive eavesdropping to active interference and DOS attacks. 
 Unlike their wired counterparts, Mobile Ad Hoc Networks don’t have firewall or 
central servers where all the intrusion can be blocked. Hence, every node should be 
equipped to deal with all kinds of attacks. In order to ensure security, each node in the 
network is authenticated using cryptographic techniques supported by a certificate 




and a centralized Certificate Authority cannot be deployed in the network. MANETS 
operate as a decentralized model and it is essential to establish trust among the nodes of 
the network. A good trust model should be scalable as well as robust.   
 Even if trust is established between nodes of the network, a node in the network 
may turn malicious. This node can misroute packets or flood the network with bogus 
packets. This node can also change the information contents of content sensitive packets. 
In order to detect this kind of malicious nodes, there should be a mechanism for intrusion 
detection along with trust establishment and secured routing.  
 In this thesis we propose a hierarchical intrusion detection system based on 
Bayesian networks. However, a node that detects an intrusion may not be trustworthy and 
may therefore report false intrusions or report intrusions that have not occurred.  Hence, 
in our approach the intrusion detection system is integrated with a trust mechanism. Both 
the intrusion detection system and the trust mechanism are Bayesian based. In [1], it is 
shown that Bayesian Networks can be used efficiently to establish trust among nodes of 
MANETS. By combining the trust model with the Intrusion Detection Unit, we study the 
effects of intruders on MANETs and how nodes in MANETs efficiently handle such 
kinds of attacks.  
 In chapter 2, we review previous work in the area of secure communication in 
MANETS. In chapter 3, the problem is defined formally. In chapter 4, a solution is 
proposed for the problem defined in Chapter 3.  Chapter 5 discusses the simulation setup 
and presents results and graphs for the experiments conducted and chapter 6 concludes 







REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 Routing Protocols for MAET: 
 The current MAC protocols for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks are all vulnerable. 
There are many protocols for routing packets between nodes in MANETs. There are no 
dedicated routers in mobile ad hoc networks. Each node acts as a router and transmits 
packets between source and destination. The node within the range of the source node 
and is not the destination node, accepts the packet sent by the source and forwards it 
along the path to the destination node. In a contention based method, each node must 
compete for control of the transmission channel each time it sends the packet. In order to 
avoid collisions, a node must adhere to strict rules and conditions. In a contention free 
method, each node must gain access to the transmission medium with the consent of 
other nodes in the network.  Regardless of contention based or contention free protocols, 
if any node is malicious, it can easily break the network by consuming packets or 
misrouting them thus breaking the whole protocol. In wired networks, there is reduced 
possibility of such kinds of attacks as networks are protected by gateways and firewalls. 
However, in wireless networks, due to the lack of a centralized authority, firewalls and 
gateways cannot be deployed. Thus in wireless networks, every node is vulnerable to 




 To conquer this problem, many wireless routing protocols are proposed that solve 
the problems mentioned above. The important routing protocols for ad hoc Wireless 
Networks include, DSDV, DSR, AODV, TORA etc.[5,6]. All these protocols assume that 
there is a trust already established among participating nodes. Many of the security 
threats lie in this assumption. A brief description of these routing protocols is given 
below.  
 Routing protocols are classified into 3 broad categories. Those are Proactive 
protocols, Reactive protocols and Hybrid protocols. Proactive protocols maintain routes 
to all nodes, including nodes to which no packets are sent. They adjust well to topology 
changes. Reactive protocols consider the demand for data transmission. Routes between 
hosts are determined only when they are needed. This can significantly reduce routing 
overhead. Hybrid protocols combine both proactive and reactive protocol properties to 
come up with a better routing protocol for efficient packet routing. [16]. Examples of 
proactive routing protocols include DSDV (Destination Sequenced Distance Vector). 
Popular reactive protocols are DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) and AODV (Ad-hoc On-
demand Distance Vector). TORA (Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm) has the 
advantages of both types of routing protocols. It is hybrid routing protocol.[6] 
 
2.2 Types of attacks on MAETS: 
 The lack of conventional authentication and identification mechanisms in Ad hoc 
Wireless Networks make these networks very vulnerable. These vulnerabilities can be 
easily exploited by malicious nodes, thus compromising the security and integrity of the 




provide little or no authentication or security. There are many ways in which malicious 
node can attack other nodes in a MANET or the MANET as a whole. There are various 
types of attacks that a malicious node can employ in order to compromise security and 
integrity of MANETs.  
 As discussed earlier, routing protocols for MANETs are highly susceptible to 
security breaches as they assume the working of wireless ad hoc networks in non-hostile 
environments. Encryption and establishment of trust among nodes of network try to 
address this problem [SAODV] [7]. However, this can not completely eliminate the 
possibility of intrusion.  
  A malicious node can employ various types of attacks on a wireless ad-hoc 
network that can range from active interference to passive eavesdropping. The malicious 
node may also act maliciously intermittently making it more difficult to detect.  
 The important goals of secured ad hoc network are Authentication, non-
repudiation, availability, integrity and privacy. The following figure summarizes the 





 Figure 2.1: Classification of Attacks [3] 
As seen from the figure, attacks on MANETs can be classified as follows.  
 1. Authentication and non- repudiation attacks. 
 2. Availability attacks. 
 3. Integrity attacks. 
 4. Confidentiality and privacy attacks.  
  
 Authentication and no-repudiation attacks can be further classified as spoofing 
attacks that include IP spoofing, MAC spoofing and/or TCP spoofing and Rushing attack. 
Availability attacks mainly consists of Gray hole attacks, Wormhole attacks, Fabrication 
attacks and resource exhaustion attacks. False message propagation attacks, misrouting 
attacks and Man-in-the-Middle attack come under integrity attacks. In confidentiality and 




 Authentication and non-repudiation attacks: Authentication can be defined as 
verifying the identity of one entity against given credentials. For example, a node in 
MANET can be authenticated with the help of its shared secret key or its MAC address. 
Authentication allows a node to identify itself in a network with the other node and 
communicate with the other node.  
 Non repudiation is the ability to prove that the sender did actually send the 
message. Almost all routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks use either MAC or IP 
address to authenticate nodes in the network. Therefore, the very first step for an intruder 
to attack ad hoc wireless network is to spoof either the IP address or the MAC address of 
any node in the network and gain access to network resources. Spoofing attacks are the 
simplest method to compromise the authentication of the network.  
 For protocols that use the suppression function for duplicate packets (for example 
TCP/IP), rushing attacks can be a non trivial possibility. In this type of attack, malicious 
node sends spurious packet to a destination before the original packet reaches the 
destination. This makes the original packet look like a duplicate packet and the receiving 
node eventually drops the original packet. The damage caused by this attack is protocol 
dependent. The UDP protocol is mode prone to such kinds of attacks while TCP is less 
prone to a rushing attack.  
 Availability attack: Availability states that network resources are available to 
authorized entities in the network whenever they want to use those resources. Availability 
guarantees that network services are accessible to nodes in the network in a timely 
manner. These types of attacks are also known as “Denial of Service (DOS)” attacks. 




as a resource consumption attack. An attacker might try to consume resources by 
selecting dropping of packets that result in increased number of route requests from 
neighbor nodes that have limited routing capabilities. Packets dropped can either be data 
packets or control packets.  
 In fabrication attacks, a malicious node can masquerade as a node along the path 
between a source node and a destination node and it continually discards packets coming 
from the source node or sends route error messages to the destination node. When a node 
receives a route error message, it will delete the route table entry for that destination 
node. If the alternate path doesn’t exist between the source node and the destination node, 
then destination node will be thrown out of the network.  
 In the tunneling attack, two malicious nodes pretend to be directly adjacent to 
each other with the help of tunneling. One node builds the message and sends it to 
another malicious node through intermediate nodes and falsely claims that there is a 
direct link with the destination node. In this way, malicious nodes can force the traffic 
through them. In the wormhole attack, a malicious node listens to a message in one part 
of the network and replays it in another part of the network with the help of another 
colluding malicious node. This type of attack can be classified under aggregated attacks 
which involve more than one malicious node.  
 If two malicious nodes transfer a heavy volume of data between them thereby 
blocking the network transmission bandwidth, other nodes will be deprived of precious 
network bandwidth. This type of attack is termed as resource depletion attack. Other 




network throughput. A resource depletion attack can also be carried out using control 
messages.  
 In a selective existence attack, a malicious node behaves selfishly for reasons 
such as saving his battery or using the network only for his own profit. A malicious node 
may not participate in any route discovery process or it may not send any control 
message to other nodes but it will only update its routing information so that it can 
correctly route packets. This will make that node an invisible node that consumes 
precious network resources. Although this type of attack can be harmless, it still can 
block network resources and if the node is snooping or modifying content of packets, it 
will be difficult to detect.  
 Integrity Attacks: Integrity guarantees that a message is not altered on its path to 
the destination. These types of attacks pose the more serious problems for MANETs. 
Various types of integrity attacks are identified until now. Some of them are discussed 
here. 
  False message propagation attack is a kind of integrity attack in which a 
malicious node advertises a route to the node with a destination sequence number greater 
than the authentic value. By doing this, it diverts the traffic towards the attacker because 
the nodes will select the route reply message with the highest destination sequence 
number. Only AODV is susceptible to this kind of attack since it uses the sequence 
number to find the route. A single node can carry out this attack. It is also known as a 




 In misrouting attack, the intruding node tries to send a data packet to a wrong 
node thus totally misrouting the packet. This type of attack can be dealt with snoopy 
intrusion detection units.  
 Man-in-the-Middle attack can be launched by any node that is in the routing path. 
It can be considered as “invisible node attack”. Here, the attacker issues fake route 
request and route reply messages to spoil other node’s routing table. The damage caused 
by this attack is only limited to the routing path on which the malicious node is present.  
 Confidentiality and privacy attacks: Privacy is termed as retaining the personal 
information stored at the node and not revealing it any other node in the network. On the 
same note, confidentiality ensures that certain information be revealed only to authorized 
nodes in the network. There are two main types of attacks that can compromise 
confidentiality and security. Those are Location disclosure attacks and Content disclosure 
attacks. 
 The location disclosure attack, as the name suggests, reveals physical location of a 
particular node in the network. This attack is based on the principle that for all multihop 
routing protocols any two consecutive nodes in a route must be geographically close.  
 The content disclosure attack enables the malicious user to get the contents of the 
messages those are transmitted in the network. If the message contains important 
information, this attack can pose a dangerous threat to the privacy of the network as a 
whole. Sometimes messages are secured using encryptions such as RSA. If an attacker 
can break the encryption, then he can easily access the payload field of the IP packet and 





2.3 Intrusion Detection in MAETs: 
 Any node in the wireless network should operate in a node that trusts no peer. 
Current MAC protocols for Ad Hoc Networks are all vulnerable for security attacks such 
as DOS. Intrusion prevention measures can be employed in Ad Hoc networks to reduce 
the threat of intrusion. However, this alone can not completely eliminate them. Most of 
the intrusion detection systems proposed so far are based on the AODV and DSR 
protocols. Some IDSs like WatchDog[2,3] are very effective for intrusion detection but 
they still suffer from some drawbacks like dependency on AODV, a node traveling out of 
range and false positives.  
Intrusion detection systems for MANETs: 
According to [17], there are three basic architectures of intrusion detection systems for 
MANETs. 
1. Stand-alone intrusion detection systems 
2. Distributed and cooperated intrusion detection systems. 
3. Hierarchical intrusion detection systems.  
Stand-alone Intrusion Detection Systems: As the name suggests, each node in the 
network is responsible for detecting intrusion in the network. Nodes do not communicate 
with each other to detect an intrusion. Each node decides by itself about the possible 
intrusion. In a network where there is no issue of battery life for nodes, this model would 
work well. In networks where battery life of node is limited, this model would be 
redundant.  
Distributed and Cooperative Intrusion Detection Systems: In this type of intrusion 




Nodes exchange different control messages or information related to intrusion detection 
among them. In this model also, each node runs the intrusion detection algorithm and 
sends the information collected to neighboring nodes in the network. This model is useful 
in detecting intrusion which involves coordinated intrusion on the network. Coordinated 
intrusion means intrusion which involves coordination of more than one node.  
Hierarchical Intrusion Detection Systems: Hierarchical intrusion detection is basically a 
cooperated intrusion detection scheme. The only difference is the network is divided into 
clusters and there is a definitive hierarchy in the network. Generally, clusterheads of each 
cluster participate in intrusion detection. Only clusterheads need to run the intrusion 
detection algorithm instead of each node in the network. This helps nodes in the network 
conserve the battery.  
Examples of intrusion detection systems in MAETs: 
Distributed and cooperative IDS: Zhang and Lee proposed the model for a distributed and 
cooperative IDS[18]. The model for an IDS agent is structured into six modules. The 
local data collection module collects real-time audit data, which includes system and user 
activities within its radio range. This collected data will be analyzed by the local 
detection engine module for evidence of anomalies. If an anomaly is detected with strong 
evidence, the IDS agent can determine independently that the system is under attack and 
initiate a response through the local response module (i.e., alerting the local user) or the 
global response module (i.e., deciding on an action), depending on the type of intrusion, 
the type of network protocols and applications, and the certainty of the evidence. If an 




cooperation of neighboring IDS agents through a cooperative detection engine module, 
which communicates to other agents through a secure communication module. 
 
Local Intrusion Detection System (LIDS): Albers et al. [19] proposed a distributed and 
collaborative architecture of IDS by using mobile agents. A Local Intrusion Detection 
System (LIDS) is implemented on every node for local concern, which can be extended 
for global concern by cooperating with other LIDS. Two types of data are ex-changed 
among LIDS: security data (to obtain complementary information from collaborating 
nodes) and intrusion alerts (to inform others of locally detected intrusion). In order to 
analyze the possible intrusion, data must be obtained from what the LIDS detects, along 



















There are many models and schemes proposed for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks that 
deal with security implementation and support. Some of them facilitate security support 
using shared secret key mechanism and certificate revocation schemes
 
[13]. Routing 
protocols designed in these schemes take care of the certificate issuance to nodes 
participating in the network and using public and secret keys they implement secure 
communication. All of these schemes rely on some intrusion detection mechanism. Based 
on the knowledge about the intrusion detected at a node, these schemes may revoke the 
certificate. There are a few solutions proposed for intrusion detection in MANETS. Most 
of them are based on the AODV routing protocol for MANETS [2]. To date, the most 
efficient security scheme for MANETs uses sharing of secret key for certificate 
revocation and issuance. However, such an approach is expensive for MANETS due to 
the limited resources in MANETs.  
 As far as we are aware, the role of trust in intrusion detection has not been 
investigated.  Trust can be defined as reliance on the integrity, strength, ability, surety 
etc. of a thing or entity. In the context of communicating wireless nodes, trust can be 
defined as the reliance on the integrity and authenticity of the node. In normal intrusion 
detection systems, which do not incorporate trust into their intrusion detection, it is very 
difficult to deduce the correct information based on the information sent by peer nodes. 




compromised or not trustworthy. As opposed to this, if a trustworthy node sends out the 
intrusion information, it is more likely that the information is correct. So, whenever 
intrusion detection is coupled with trust, it will give better results for detecting an 
intrusion.  
A malicious node may report an intrusion and accuse another node of the intrusion.  This 
may result in the accused node being ejected from the network.  In this thesis we propose 
an intrusion detection mechanism that takes trust into account. This will result in fewer 
false accusations and intrusions reported will be genuine.   
In [1], the authors propose a trust model for certificate revocation in Ad Hoc Networks 
based on Bayesian networks. Our proposed Intrusion Detection Unit (IDU) is coupled 
with the underlying Bayesian network for establishing trust. In this model, trust is built 
periodically over time.     
In [1], the authors describe the IDU to be located in each node. Trust is calculated based 
on the recommendation of the IDU along with other parameters. The trust model they 






(from other nodes) 
Direct experience IDU reco. Portfolio of credentials 
(from target node) 




Figure 2.2: Trust Model for MAETS 
 According to this diagram, if the IDU signals, the trust is immediately set to zero 
for the particular node. Other than intrusion detection, trust is calculated based upon other 
factors such as direct experience of previous communication with the node, 
recommendations for other trustworthy nodes etc.  
 The IDU works as follows. When a node is in snooping state, it searches for the 
nearby node within its range. If that snooping node can hear the transmission between 
two nodes, then that node goes to the monitor state [2,5]. This means that it monitors the 
traffic between those two nodes. The main aim of this node is to ensure that the node 
does not alter the packet or the path.  
We assume that all nodes can monitor other nodes and be monitored by other nodes as 


















In this work we study the following types of attacks:  
• DoS attack 
• Packet misrouting 
• spoofing  
• Information Destruction attack 
Of  the attacks mentioned above, Dos attack can be thought of as an availability 
attack. Packet misrouting and spoofing is considered as an Integrity attack. These four 
attacks represent the broad spectrum of security attacks on Ad Hoc networks. 
In the proposed solution a node is snooped by one or more nodes within 
communication range of the current node. Based on the information that the snooping 
node gets, it builds a table and communicates with every other node except the node that 
is being snooped. In our approach not all nodes can snoop on the given node. We divide 
the network into clusters and only cluster-heads can snoop. If the network is large, it 
would be very difficult to maintain the network and mark out intrusive nodes efficiently. 
If the network is divided into clusters, we would get the localized information of the 
particular area of the network. Subsequently, we can easily mark out intrusive nodes from 
that localized area. Moreover, by allowing cluster-heads to snoop at a given time, the 




having only few nodes in the network as snoopers, only those nodes will need the 
extra computing power as opposed to all the nodes.  
In our approach, a cluster-head can only snoop at the nodes within its cluster. Due to 
mobility, clusters and cluster-heads change and the group of snooping nodes is therefore 
dynamic. The group of snooping nodes called “Active snoopers” is decided using the 
Dominating Sets algorithm proposed by Fie Dai and Jai Wu. [15]
 
  
The Dominating set algorithm is very useful and efficient in partitioning a network into 
clusters. The dominating sets approach is explained in detail below. The dominating set 
algorithm divides the network into clusters and assigns cluster-heads to each cluster. 
These cluster-heads act as active snoopers in the network and help in detecting an 
intrusion. 
The network life cycle consists of 3 phases: 
• Network initialization phase  
• Network uptime phase: 
• Network shut down phase: 
 In the network initialization phase, network parameters are set, The Certificate 
Authority id is announced and all the links and bandwidth made available. When a node 
wants to join the network, initially it needs to get a certificate from the Certificate 
Authority and authenticates itself against its credentials. This authentication is carried out 
before the node joins the network. The certificate authority issues a valid certificate to the 
node by a checking node’s authenticity. This is beyond the scope of this research and it is 
assumed that the node is authenticated before joining the network by the certificate 




boot up along with all other services. It will remain active throughout the lifetime of the 
node in the network whenever the node is an active snooping node. If the node is not 
snooping at the given instance of time, it can turn the IDU off to save battery.  
 In the network shutdown phase, all nodes save the information they collected to 
the permanent storage, turn their IDUs off, relinquish their authentication credentials and 
leave the network. 
4.1 etwork Initialization phase: Formation of Dominating Sets: 
 A finite set of nodes in the network form a group together that act as “Active 
Snoopers”. To form such a group, the Dominating Set algorithm [14] can be used 
efficiently. This is a localized algorithm which can quickly converge to a group. In [14] 
the authors propose a simple algorithm for the formation of Dominating Sets where the 
dominating set is formed in two phases. In the first phase, called a “marking process”, 
hosts interact with others in the neighborhood. Each host is marked true if it has two 
“unconnected neighbors”. In this context, “unconnected neighbor” means those nodes 
which are not within communication range of each other. In the second phase, called 
“pruning process”, the set of marked nodes is pruned according to two rules. According 
to dominant pruning rule 1, a marked node can unmark itself if its neighbor set is covered 
by another marked node. According to rule 2, a marked host can unmark itself if its 
neighborhood is covered by two other directly connected marked nodes. By applying 
rules 1 and rule 2, we get a dominating set that is small and that covers almost all the area 
on which the network is spread.  
 The nodes in the dominating set form the clusterheads that is the group of active 




hierarchical relationship. For example, in the following figure, a solid line node is the 
cluster-head of a cluster.  
 
 
Fig. 4.1: Formation of Clusters and cluster-heads 
The clusterhead of the sending node can observe the transmission. However, it 
cannot observe the data when that data travels out of its cluster boundary. Hence, the 
clusterhead contacts the neighboring clusterhead and informs it about the incoming data. 
All clusterheads are interconnected with each other through the dominating set.  
etwork update phase: Maintaining Dominating sets 
The idea of dominating sets and cluster formation fits well for detecting intrusions 
in Ad Hoc Networks. Nodes in the network can move freely within the network. Each 
time a node moves out of the cluster, its cluster-head membership needs to be re-assigned 
again. Whenever a node has moved out of range of the cluster-head, the cluster-head 
notifies its parent in the tree or the neighboring cluster-head. If the network is divided 
into multiple levels of cluster-heads, then the child cluster-head will notify its parent 
cluster-head. Otherwise, the cluster-head will notify its neighboring cluster-head.  
The formation of clusters and cluster-heads is a recursive algorithm. Initially, the 
network is divided into clusters with respective cluster-heads. If in a given cluster, there 
are more nodes than the cluster-head can manage, then that cluster will again be sub-
clustered within the cluster. The new sub-cluster will have a new cluster-head which will 
        Clusterhead 
 
        Normal node 
 





now be the child node of the original cluster-head. This process is iterated until the 
number of nodes in all the clusters is within a certain threshold.  
 
In the case where the cluster is further divided into subclusters, the cluster-head of 
each subcluster will be member of a cluster with it own cluster-head as parent. This is 
shown below.  
 There will not be a single root to the tree at any given time if the threshold for the 
number of nodes in a cluster is arranged properly. In other words, there will not be a 
single point of failure in the network at any given point in time. There is also a possibility 
that two nodes would be present in two clusters at the same level if they are boundary 
nodes. In that case, both cluster-heads will snoop on those nodes.  
 
Fig. 4.2: Formation of sub-clusters and cluster-heads 
If a child cluster-head notifies the parent about possible node movement, the 
parent in turn, notifies neighboring cluster-heads about the possible arrival of the node. If 
a node arrives in another cluster, the head of that cluster associates a relationship with 










The parent in turn notifies the previous head about the ownership change. Also, 
there might be a node in the parent cluster which is not a cluster-head. That node is 
treated as a regular node in any other cluster for this scheme.  
Although this solution given above takes care of the mobility of nodes, it poses another 
problem. If all nodes move to one part of the network, then that part will be overcrowded 
and difficult to maintain while another part will be empty resulting in a network partition. 
To deal with this problem, a threshold value is set for each cluster. This threshold 
measures the number of nodes in the cluster that cluster-head can handle. If the number 
of nodes in the cluster becomes greater than the threshold, then the cluster is recomputed 
again. In this manner all clusters are maintained at a manageable level. 
The tree is formed based on the density of nodes in the network. First of all, the network 
is divided into clusters as mentioned above. If there is more than a certain number of 
nodes in a given cluster, then that cluster is again divided into subclusters with a new 
sub-cluster head. This process is recursive till the size of cluster is manageable. In the 
simulation, which is carried out as a part of this research, only one iteration of the 
algorithm was necessary. Our approach has good scalability over big networks as it 
recursively forms sub-clusters.  
 The above scenario can be divided into 2 cases and its sub-cases as follows. 
Case 1: Child in a cluster moves 
 1A – When a child moves out  
 For every specified time interval, the cluster head sends HELLO message to all its 
child nodes. If after a certain RTT (Round Trip Time) value, it doesn’t receive an ACK, 




HELLO message. After the second HELLO message, if the cluster-head still does not 
receive an ACK, it assumes that node has traveled outside the cluster boundaries. If the 
parent is at the top of the tree, it will notify the neighboring cluster-head of all child 
cluster-heads about the possible arrival of the node. Neighboring cluster-heads will run 
the search algorithm to find the new node in their cluster if there is any. If a cluster-head 
finds the new node, it establishes the parent-child relationship between itself and the new 
node and adds that node to the list of its child nodes.  If a parent is not the top of the tree, 
it will notify its parent in turn about the node moving out of the cluster. The parent in turn 
notifies its child nodes which are neighbors of the first cluster-head and then the 
neighboring cluster-heads run the search algorithm described above. This is done 
recursively up the tree hierarchy if needed. As explained above, if the number of child 
nodes within a cluster reaches a certain lower threshold limit, the cluster is re-computed 
again by running the dominating sets algorithm. 
1B – When cluster-head is notified about possible node arrival 
When a cluster-head is notified about the possible arrival of the node from a neighboring 
cluster-head or its parent in the tree, it runs the search algorithm to find the new node if 
there is any. This is explained below.  
If clusterhead A detects a new node it will inform its child cluster-head A1 or its neighbor 
B. A node in the network can move freely with no knowledge of clusters. It is the duty of 
the cluster-head to make correct associations with nodes within its cluster. Cluster-head B 
broadcasts an IDENTIFY message in its cluster. The IDENTIFY message tells every 
node in the cluster that cluster-head needs to identify its children. Every node in its 




received with the Ids in its table of cluster members. If the Ids are exactly the same as 
that in the table, it assumes that there is no new node in its cluster and ignores the 
notification of the possible arrival of a new node.  
 If there is a reply from the node with the new Id, it adds that Id to its cluster 
members; notifies the peer about the new arrival and updates the table. The peer node in 
turn updates its tables as well. A peer node may be the neighboring cluster or the parent 
up the tree hierarchy. When a neighboring cluster-head notifies the cluster-head about the 
arrival of a new node, the peer node is the neighboring cluster-head. When a parent 
notifies one of its children about the arrival of a new node, the peer node is parent cluster-
head. If the peer is the parent, it notifies the child node about the node movement. The 
child node in turn updates its information. 
Case 2: Parent moves out of the cluster. 
In this case, there are two scenarios. 
 Case 2A: Parent is not the top node of the tree. 
 If the parent of the cluster is not the root of the tree, then it is the child node of 
some other node in the tree hierarchy. This cluster-head is treated as a node in the cluster 
with the cluster-head as parent of the node. This is similar to case 1. Therefore, the 
cluster-head is moved to another cluster and its relationship is established with another 
cluster-head as described in case 1. The only problem here is child nodes of a moved out 
cluster-head become orphans as they have no cluster-head. To deal with this problem, the 
grand-parent of those nodes acts as a cluster-head for those nodes. If there are more nodes 
in the cluster than the threshold, the dominating sets algorithm is executed again to re-




 Case 2B: Parent is the top node in the tree. 
 In this case, if the cluster-head moves, it goes to another cluster. As a result, child 
nodes in a particular cluster do not receive HELLO message from the cluster-head. 
Therefore, child nodes in that cluster chose some node from themselves as a temporary 
cluster-head depending on some voting scheme. For this simulation, it has been assumed 
that the node with highest Id will be new cluster-head. This cluster-head then broadcasts 
the NEW-CLUSTER-HEAD message all over the network. When a neighboring cluster-
head receives this message, it updates the table with the new cluster-head’s id and send 
out PEER-CLUSTER-HEAD messages to the new cluster-head. In this way, every 
cluster-head is updated.  
 After a new cluster-head is assigned for a given cluster, it then notifies 
neighboring cluster-heads about the possible arrival of a new node which was an old 
cluster-head of its cluster. The neighboring clusters will then run the search algorithm 
described above and establish the relationship with the new node in the cluster if there is 
any.  
 
4.2 Hierarchical Distributed intrusion detection  
 In the trust architecture proposed in [1] there is an IDU at each node to detect 
intrusions. However, if the node is not trustworthy, any intrusions detected may not be 
reported by the node or a node may report false intrusions. We propose a hierarchical 
intrusion detection system to  




2. Ensure that detected intrusions that are reported are trustworthy. In other words, even 
if an untrustworthy node reports (or fails to report) an intrusion, the hierarchical 
intrusion detection system will determine whether a trustworthy intrusion has taken 
place. 
 
4.2.1 Intrusion detection 
 For detecting an intrusion in the network, we have used a divide and conquer 
approach. If the intrusion can be detected within the cluster, then the cluster-head of the 
cluster will detect the intrusion by itself. If it can not be detected using one cluster-head, 
neighboring cluster-heads will detect the intrusion together in a cooperative manner. This 
is explained in detail below. If the source node and destination node are in the same 
cluster, then intra-cluster intrusion detection is invoked. On the other hand, if source node 
and destination node are in different clusters, then inter-cluster intrusion detection is 
invoked.  
Phase 1: Intra-cluster Intrusion Suspicion formation 
 The hierarchical structure of our approach makes it scalable. A suspicion is raised 
when the activity is not as expected, but this may be due to unusual but innocent factors. 
It is therefore not advisable to classify such nodes as malicious. Or the other hand, there 
are some activities which can be immediately detected as being malicious and in such 
cases, an intrusion is detected and the node is branded untrustworthy. We do not discuss 
each attack in detail, instead we use the DoS attack to illustrate our approach. The logic 
for detecting other attacks is exactly the same as DoS. We simply need to modify the 
parameter values for the other types of attack. For the DoS attack, the monitoring node sets a 




number of packets exceeds a certain threshold value, that node is labeled as suspect. The 
suspicion is defined as  
Suspicion = (no of packets over threshold – threshold level)/threshold level 
The suspicion is normalized. This information is sent to the neighboring clusterhead in the path of 
the packet. 
As stated earlier, the underlying model used here is the Bayesian network model [1]. All 
nodes are divided into clusters and each cluster has a cluster head. If a node in a cluster 
finds out that a particular node in the network is misbehaving, it calculates the 
conditional probability that the node is malicious. This probability is based upon many 
parameters. Some of the important parameters are node history, active time in the 
network, ratio of transmitting invalid data or control information against valid data or 
control information etc. Based on these factors, probability of maliciousness is calculated 
for the node in question using the Bayesian principle.  
The naïve Bayes’ Theorem is mathematically expressed as  






ehP =            (1) 
P(h) is called the prior probability of hypothesis and P(e) is the prior probability of 
evidence e. P(h|e) is the conditional probability of occurrence of hypothesis h given 
evidence e is true is known as the posterior probability. Similarly P(e|h) is the probability 
of e given h. Hence when we get all the values, we can calculate the posterior probability 
using Bayes’ theorem. 
 Using the Naïve Bayes’ theorem, we can calculate the probability of an attack by 
a node on the network. Consider the example of a packet misrouting attack. Assume that, 




The clusterhead of node A will snoop on nodes 1 and 2 to check the intrusion. In the 
initialization phase, node 2 has been assigned some prior probability value for attack by 
the Certification Authority depending upon the trust of the node. Suppose that probability 
is denoted as P(h). If the clusterhead of A finds that node 2 is misbehaving by misrouting 
the packet, it calculates the posterior probability of attack Patt.  
If we assume that the probability of packet misrouting by node 2 is P(e), the probability 
of attack Patt  is obtained from (1) as. 





Patt =                 (2). 
Over a given range on samples, e.g., if out of 10 times, node 2 misroutes the packet 6 






)( =  
Hence, P(e) in this case would be 6/10 = 0.6. 
Similarly, probability of evidence P(e) is calculated for different types of attacks as 
follows. 













)( =  
P(e|h) is the conditional probability of evidence given hypothesis h is true. Thus if out of 
100 attacks identified, if 20 attacks are DoS, then P(e|h) for DoS is 0.2. Similarly, P(e|h) 




Now we have all the values on the right hand side of equation 2. Putting those values in 
the equation, we can calculate the posterior probability of attack by a node that causes 
packet misrouting.  
Patt calculated using the above procedure is then compared with the pre-defined threshold 
value for the network. This threshold value is set up at the time of network initiation 
phase and is one of the parameters for tuning the performance of the scheme. If the 
threshold value is set up too high, then there would be many false alarms. If it is too low, 
then many nodes would not be detected by the scheme. For this simulation, it is set up at 
0.6. The threshold value of 0.6 is optimal in the sense that, it is greater the average trust 
i.e. 0.5 and it is also not too high. If the probability of attack is greater than the threshold, 
the node 2 will be marked as intrusive and the clusterhead will convey the information to 
neighboring clusterheads.  
 
Phase 2: Inter-cluster level Intrusion suspicion/detection  
 It is possible that several nodes may be taken over by a malicious node for a DoS 
or other attack.  Each node along the path may initiate a small DoS attack resulting in a 
full-fledged attack on the network. Suspicion may be raised with each cluster, but that 
does not indicate that an attack is actually taking place. In such cases it becomes 
necessary to obtain information from multiple cluster-heads to determine if an intrusion is 
occurring or not. 
 In our approach, a clusterhead cannot detect intrusions within its own cluster. This 
is because the cluster-head itself may not be trustworthy and any intrusion it claims to 
detect (or vice-versa) may not be true. Therefore a cluster-head only detects intrusions 




malicious, its maliciousness is detected by neighboring cluster-heads or the parent of that 
cluster-head (if there is one) using the underlying trust model.  
Working of Intrusion Detection Unit: 
  In our approach, each node will construct a simple Bayesian network to 
determine if an attack is actually taking place. In particular, we consider the following 
scenarios: 
Single attack by a single node within a cluster  
 If the attack is a DoS attack by a node in cluster n, the cluster-head n sends the 
suspicion to the next cluster-head p in the path of the packet. Cluster-head p derives the 
Bayesian network as shown below (fig 4.4) Here Tr(n) is defined to be the trust on the 
cluster-head n that sent the information. This trust is determined using the bayes trust 
model described in [1]. As mentioned in [1], each node keeps a trust table of every other 
node in the network. Att(n) is defined to be the probability of attack, which is the 
normalized suspicion where n is the id of cluster-head n. Atti(n) is the conditional 
probability that the attack has taken place given the trustworthiness of node n where i is a 
specific event like Spoofing. The procedure for calculating Att(n) is explained in the 






nAtt =  
Here P(h) = Prior probability of hypothesis = Prior Probability that the attack is DoS. 
P(e) = Prior probability of evidence = Probability that the attack occured is found out 




The probability of detecting an attack given that the node n is reporting an intrusion 




Figure 4.3: Bayesian etwork model for single node attack 
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In this equation, if we substitute the values of trust of node and normalized probability 
values, we get the probability of attack by the node. This can be clarified with an 
example. Suppose, node A is a DoS intruding node (this is not a cluster-head). Node B 
which is the clusterhead of cluster with node A detects the intrusion and it notifies the 
neighboring cluster-head C of the possible intrusion. Node C has a certain level of trust 
on node B along with the value for probability of DoS attack. Suppose the trust on node 
B by node C is 0.75. This trust value is obtained from the underlying trust model 
proposed in [1] and the probability of attack with evidence is 0.6, and the posterior 
probability of DoS attack by node A is 0.5.  
In other words, Tr(B) = 0.75,  
  AttDoS(B) = 0.6 





Pr((Atti(n)=1) | Tn(n)=1, Att(m)=1)) = 0.75 
Pr((Atti(n)=1) | Tn(n)=1, Att(m)=0)) = 0.10 
Pr((Atti(n)=1) | Tn(n)=0, Att(m)=1)) = 0.5 





  AttDoS(A) = 0.5 
Here using equation 1, the probability of DoS attack by node A can be calculated as  
Probability of DoS attack. by A = Tr(B) * ((AttDoS(B) * AttDoS(A)) / Tr(B) AND AttDoS(B) 
   = 0.75 * ((0.6 * 0.5) / 0.75 AND 0.6) 
  =  0.225 
 
If an attack is determined, the trust in the attacking node is adjusted by the formula 
explained below. Probability of attack by a given node is calculated using the above 
formula. As explained above, cluster-head p has the information of the Trust probability 
of node n. Considering the trustworthiness of the node which raises intrusion suspicion to 
node p, node p calculates the probability of attack by constructing the Bayesian Network 
as shown in figure 4.4. Based on the trust of the node and conditional probability of the 
attack, normalized probability of the attack is calculated. For example, if probability trust 
of node is 1 and probability of attack is also 1, then there is high probability that the 
attack has actually taken place. This is denoted in figure 4.4 as Pr(att(n)) = 0.75. 
Similarly, if the trust of node is 0 and probability of attack is also 0, then there is slight 
possibility that actual attack have taken place. Hence in the last case, Pr(att) is 0.05. 
There is one problem remaining – what if the intrusion detection node is itself not 
trustworthy. Since the intrusion suspicion is broadcast, other clusterheads will also be 
computing the intrusion detection and a simple majority vote taken.  
Each node maintains the table which contains the following information. Node Id, Cluster 




P(e) for Misrouting, P(e) for Information Destroyal, P(h) for DoS, P(h) for Misrouting, 
P(h) for Information Destroyal, Total # of attacks, # DoS attacks, # Misrouting attacks, # 
Information Destroyal attacks. At each time, the algorithm is run, probability values and 
trust is updated for the given node. 
 
 
Single attack by a multiple nodes in multiple clusters  
Here multiple clusterheads may send suspicions to peer cluster-heads Here Atti(m) is the 
probability of attack for a specific event i reported by node m, that is, the suspicion. 
 
Fig 4.4: selection of two most trustworthy nodes 
 
When multiple cluster-heads send a suspicion, two of them are chosen in the following 
manner: The trust level of each of the cluster-heads is compared with each other. The 
cluster-heads which have the highest levels of trust among them are chosen for 
constructing the Baysian Network. This is because, every cluster-head will have the same 
information about the intrusion suspicion. So there is no need to take into account the 
information sent by every node. Instead, two cluster-heads with highest trust level are 
chosen and their information is used in detecting the intrusion.  
Atti(i)           .  .   . Attj(i) 
compare Atti(i) … Attj(i) 
select the two nodes a and b such that 
Tr(m) ≥ Tr(n)  ≥  Tr(c) … Tr(k)  
 




As shown in figure 4.5, multiple cluster-heads raise the suspicion on the particular node. 
After comparing trusts of all nodes, only nodes m and n that have the highest trust levels 
are chosen. A clusterhead may receive reports on a single attack i from many nodes. This 
may result in a large Bayesian network. Resources in ad hoc networks are limited and to 
keep the Bayesian network simple, only the reports from the two most trustworthy nodes 
m and n are considered. This process is shown in fig 4.5 above. Next the network obtains 
the probability that cluster-head m and n are suspicious of a particular attack i and 
calculates the total probability (fig 4.5). 
 




















Pr((Atti(n)=1) | Tn(n)=1, Attn(i)=1)) = 0.5 
Pr((Atti(n)=1) | Tn(n)=1, Attn (i)=0)) = 0.15 
Pr((Atti(n)=1) | Tn(n)=0, Attn (i)=1)) = 0.25 
Pr((Atti(n)=1) | Tn(n)=0, Attn (i)=0)) = 0.5 
 
single attack by 
multiple  nodes 
Pr((AttFINAL=1) | Atti(m)=1, Atti(n)=1)) = 0.3 
Pr((AttFINAL=1) | Atti(m)=1, Atti(n)=0)) = 0.75 
Pr((AttFINAL=1) | Atti(m)=0, Atti(n)=1)) = 0.25 
Pr((AttFINAL=1) | Atti(m)=0, Atti(n)=0)) = 0.8 
 
Pr((Atti(m)=1) | Tn(m)=1, Attm(i)=1)) = 0.75 
Pr((Atti(m)=1) | Tn(m)=1, Attm (i)=0)) = 0.10 
Pr((Atti(m)=1) | Tn(m)=0, Attm (i)=1)) = 0.5 





There will be more entries in the tables in this case, but it will still be minimal and not 
take up much storage. Furthermore table look up is fast. 
 If an attack is determined, the trust in the attacking node is adjusted by underlying 
trust model explained in [1]. Therefore in both cases the probability of an attack being 
classified as an attack is at its highest when the node reporting a suspicion is trustworthy 
and the attack suspicion is high. 
 The above two would be the most common attack scenarios in an ad hoc network.  
Other possible attack scenarios would include a cluster-head reporting multiple attacks at 
the same time or multiple cluster-heads reporting multiple attacks at the same time.   
 For other types of attacks viz. Packet misrouting, spoofing and Information 
destruction attack, the cluster-head will form the Bayesian network similar to the one 
explained in the above example. However, for each type of attack, there would be a 
different probability of attack value associated with the given node. 
 If there are multiple attacks by the same node, the cluster-head of that node will 
notify each attack separately to other cluster-heads. Each cluster-head then will treat this 
attack as a separate attack and construct the Bayesian network for each attack. 
4.3 Trust Based Intrusion Detection Algorithm 
The algorithm for the Intrusion Detection Unit is outlined below: 
for each node i, set: threshold values thDoS  for DoS attacks; inactivity timeout tDoS; 
updating time update  for the intrusion table 
Define clusters based on dominating sets algorithm. All Clusterheads snoop by 
monitoring the incoming packet and outgoing packet for each node 
 
While network is up 
begin 
If TimeToUpdate == true 
begin 
 Update network tables. 




 Remove nodes which are moved out of network   
If ReconstructDominatingSets == true 
 begin 




If clusterhead j detects mismatch between incoming packet and outgoing 
packet at node i  then 
begin 
clusterhead j runs probability calculation on node i to determine 
probability of attack; 
clusterhead j sends probability to neighboring clustehead k 
clusterhead k uses Bayesian network to determine maliciousness nmi of 
node i depending upon the trust of clusterhead j 
If node maliciousness value nmi > 
th
DoS  then 
network is flooded with accusation message for node i. 
If cluster-head j is malicious, then clusterhead k will determine it with the 



















SIMULATIO AD RESULTS 
The following performance metrics were studied during the simulation. 
- Accuracy of detection  
- Accuracy of trust model  
- Overheads (cluster formation, Control messages, trust calculation etc. ) 
- Packet delivery ratio  
This simulation is carried out using the following scenario. 
- Number of nodes in the network: 100. 
- % of attacking nodes:  
o Case 1: 10% 
o Case 2: 25% and  
o Case 3: 50 % 
- Attacks simulated: DoS, Packet misrouting, Spoofing.  
- Nodes for each attack: 10, 25 and 50. 
- Communications taking place: Point to Point wireless IP communication with no 
access points. 
- Information about the nodes is gathered every 10 seconds.  
- Packet size: Each packet carries a variable payload. It is determined randomly. 
Values can range from 0 to 1024 bytes. 




- Transmission rate: A node can transmit packets randomly. It depends upon when the 
node is selected to transmit the packet. The transmission interval is also chosen 
randomly. Transmission interval can range from 0 seconds to 1 minute. Number of 
packets transmitted can vary between 0 to 100 packets in a minute. Regular payload 
on the packet is at max 1024 bytes. (1 KB) 
Detailed simulation pseudo code is explained in appendix. In brief, following steps 
are performed for the simulation 
Network Initiation Phase: 
// Initialize node parameters i.e. node-id, trust of node and probability of attacks. 
- For each node in the network, assign a node id, randomly assign trust value and 
various probability values.  
- Choose some nodes are intrusive nodes.  
- Divide network into clusters using dominating sets algorithm proposed in [14]. 
Network Uptime Phase:  
 This phase marks the actual working of the wireless network, nodes move 
throughout and out of the network, they communicate with one another, they die due to 
lack of energy etc. It is in this phase that, IDUs of cluster-heads detect if there is intrusion 
in the network. This works as follows. 
- Randomly move nodes from point to point 
- Simulate communication between nodes 
- Cluster-heads snoop on the network 
- If intrusion is detected network tables are updated 





The algorithm proposed above takes finite time to converge to a result. It marks 
intrusive nodes with desirable accuracy. Here desirable accuracy means, the accuracy 
measure that was set up prior to the simulation run. For 3 runs of the simulation, there 
was only one false positive over 50% intruding nodes which is very good accuracy. The 
most complex part of the algorithm is to divide the network into clusters. For 
performance, we can run the cluster formation in a separate thread so that it would not 
affect the working of the main thread. Detecting an intrusion is a straightforward process. 
Therefore is fast and it does not consume more resources on the node.  
 After running the simulation for different sets of nodes and different number of 
intrusive nodes, it is proved that the simulation marks intrusive nodes and eliminates 
them.  
 The above cases cover all the scenarios in real time. This means that, there is no 
waiting time to get the result of the intrusion detection. It is calculated while the 
algorithm is running and it is applied instantly to mark and remove intruding nodes. In 
the first case, it is assumed that 10% of nodes are intrusive. To detect all the intrusive 
nodes in the network under this condition, it is seen that it needs few number of iterations 
and control messages to mark all intrusive nodes. In the second case, it is assumed that, 
25 % of nodes are intrusive. To detect all intrusive nodes, the number of iterations and 
control messages needed is more than that of case 1. Similarly, for the case 3, it is 
assumed that 50 % of nodes are intrusive. It takes considerably longer time to find all 
intrusive nodes. Moreover, in this particular case, the number of control messages 




 By looking at the trend in the above test cases, it can be stated that as the number 
of intrusive nodes increase in the network, the rate of convergence decreases and the 
number of control messages needed to detect intrusion increases. Rate of convergence 
means the rate at which bad nodes are removed from the network.  
 Below is the graphical representation of the scenarios discussed above. In the 
following graph, one iteration constitutes for one complete scan of the system – One scan 
includes running the algorithm for one minute. Every 1 minute, the whole process is 





















Figure 5.1: umber of intrusive nodes 
The simulation is executed for 3 times for each different percentage of intrusive nodes 
and the average taken. In first case, all the 10 % intrusive nodes were detected correctly 
by the 3
rd
 iteration. In second and third case, 25 % and 50 % intrusive nodes were 
detected correctly by the 5
th
 iteration. This is because, as number of intrusive nodes 




heads to report more attacks in a comparatively small timeframe. Thus 25% and 50 % 
nodes were detected in 5 iterations. This shows that algorithm converges quickly for 



























% of Data Packets
 
Figure 5.2: Useful information during communication 
In the above graph, useful information means the percentage of data packets sent while 
the algorithm is running. To simulate a real time situation, the network consists of data 
packets as well as control packets and messages to maintain and form dominating sets. 
There is also considerable flow of messages between cluster-heads. Considering all these 
scenarios, it is seen that the percentage of data packets decrease as the number of 
intrusive nodes increase. The simulation is run till all the intrusive nodes are removed 
from the network. This is due to the fact that as number of intrusive nodes increase, it 
takes more effort and time for cluster-heads and nodes to mark them as intrusive and 



























# of False Positives
 
Figure 5.3: umber of false positives 
This is the graph of false positives vs. intrusive nodes. From the graph, it is seen that out 
of 100 nodes there was not a single false positive until the number of intrusive nodes 
reached 50%. This confirms the fact that the algorithm proposed here is very accurate. 
When the number of intrusive nodes was set to 50 % of total nodes in the network, there 
was one false positive; meaning, one node was detected as intrusive node even though it 
was not one. 
 To compare the effectiveness of this trust scheme with a non-trust scheme, one 
more analysis is performed. Initially, the algorithm is executed with no trust 
consideration for all nodes. It is noted that, as time progresses, cluster-heads which are 
intrusive tend to raise false intrusion notification. This causes an increase in the number 






Figure 5.4: False positives with no trust in consideration 
In the next run, trust is restored into the nodes and is increased gradually according to 
equation (1). It is interesting to note that until the trust in the cluster-heads becomes 
stable, the number of false positives is almost similar to that of the above run which does 
not include trust. But after the network stabilized, the number of false positives is 
reduced. This is because, when a cluster-head with less trust notifies about an intrusion, 
that node is not marked as intrusive immediately., instead, it is marked as a “potentially 
intrusive” node. In the subsequent intrusion detection process by other cluster-heads, it is 
found that the cluster-head which initially reported an intrusion is lying. Thus trust in that 
cluster-head is reduced and the node which is marked as potentially intrusive is 





Figure 5.5: False positives with trust in consideration 
As can be seen, initially, the trust in not built. Over a period of time, the network 
matures and correct trust is built between the nodes. Thus until the trust is built we get 
many false positives meaning nodes which are innocent are marked as malicious by an 
intrusive cluster-head. However once the correct trust of the intrusive cluster-head is 
determined, the number of false positives reduce because intrusive cluster-heads are 












In this thesis, we have proposed a unique hierarchical approach to detect 
intrusions in Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks. The basic trust model introduced by J Thomas 
[1] ensures that trust is established between peers in the network. Depending upon the 
trust and the maliciousness of the node, the algorithm efficiently detects intrusive nodes 
and excludes them from utilizing the network resources. Furthermore due to the 
conditional probability methods used in conjunction with Bayes Theorem, it is ensured 
that even if some innocent node misbehaves sometimes, it will not be treated as an 
intrusive node immediately. From the graphs, it is evident that the model is very accurate 
in detecting intrusions. Furthermore, it converges very well for a large percentage of 
intrusive nodes in the network. In terms of battery power, it uses the minimal power 
required to detect intrusions as not all nodes need to be involved in intrusion detection. 
This method has little overhead in detecting the intrusion as it divides the network into 
dynamic clusters. Moreover, after a specified amount of time, clusters are recalculated to 
ensure the integrity of network. Although there are some overheads, considering the 
advantages and simplicity of use, these are overheads that are worth the cost.  
 There is room for improvement on this work in several areas. Firstly, the 
algorithm used for calculating dominating takes exponential time as the network grows. 




attacks with little modification. The Bayesian model can also be extended to make it 
more generic.  For example, multiple attacks by a single node, or multiple nodes 
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Detailed pseudo code of intrusion detection algorithm: 
Network Initiation Phase: 
1. Initialize node parameters i.e. node-id, trust of node and probability of attacks. 
 For i = 1 To n……………………………..\\n = no. of nodes in network.  
  Node(i).Id ← i; 
  Node(i).Tr ← rand(); 
  Node(i).Pr-DOS ← rand(); 
  Node(i).Pr-Spoof ← rand(); 
  Node(i).Pr-PMR ← rand(); 
  Node(i).Pr-ID ← rand(); 
 EndFor 
// Set some nodes as Intrusive. 
 Badids ← GenerateRandomIds(); 
For I = 0 to BadIds.Length()  
 Node(id).IsIntrusiveNode ← True;  
EndFor 









is used. The above algorithm explains how the nodes in the network are initialized and 
clustered. For testing purposes, some nodes are assigned as intrusive nodes.  
 
Network Uptime Phase: 
As stated above, this phase marks the actual working of the wireless network, 
nodes move throughout and out of the network, they communicate with one another, they 
die due to lack of energy etc. It is in this phase that, IDUs of clusterheads will find out the 
intrusion in the network. This works as follows.  
To simulate the exact working of the network, variable timer value is used. In 
every swipe of the code, timer is assigned a random value generated by a function rand(). 
This will enable moving of nodes randomly at random time To move nodes, ids of the 
nodes are selected randomly and those nodes are moved in random directions in the 
network. So, in this simulation, any node can move any time in any direction. Also, more 
than one node can move in any direction at any time. This is the similar condition for any 
kind of real AdHoc Network. For mobility, random waypoint model is used. 










 TimerInterval = rand();} 
// Function Definition for MoveNodes(); 
MoveNodes() 
{ 
 NodesTobeMoved ← GenerateRandomIds(); 
 For I = 0 To NodesTobeMoved.Length() 
  Direction ← GenerateRandomDirection(); 
  Speed ← GenerateRandomSpeed(); 
  Node(id).Move(Direction, Speed); 
 EndFor 
} 
// Function Definition for Snoop(); 
Snoop() 
{ clusterHeads ← GetClusterHeads(); 
 foreach cluster_head in clusterheads 
  Foreach node in clusterHeadChildren 
   if (Node.IsCommunicating) 
    CheckForIntrusion(Node.Id, Node.Packet); 








The code above is very self explanatory. During snooping activity, each cluster-
head scans its own cluster. If any node in the cluster is in communicating state, it extracts 
the source, destination and next-hop address from the packet. These values are then used 
to check the intrusion. Here it is assumed that a cluster-head can snoop on one 
transmission at a given time.  
 





This function checks to see if any network parameters such as clusters, intrusion 
tables need to be updated. For example, it may be needed to re-organize clusters because 
these clusters are not optimized for their operations. Also, intrusion tables may need to be 
updated with new information collected by cluster-heads. All this is done during this 
phase and the result is notified to other cluster heads.  
 
//Function definition for RecalculateClustersIfNeeded() 
{ 
 If TimeSinceLastClusterFormation > 5 Mins  
 Foreach Cluster-Head in cluster-heads 
  If (nodes in cluster-head < 3) 




   Break; 





//Function definition for CheckForIntrusion(NodeId, DataPacket); 
CheckForIntrusion() 
{ 
 If(DataPacket.NextHop is Not in CurrentCluster) 
  ProcessInterClusterIntrusionDetection(NodeId, DataPacket); 
 EndIf 
 Else 
  If (DosAttackDetected) 
Temp ← (Cluster-Head.Pr-DOS * Node(NodeId).Pr-DOS / 
Cluster-Head.Tr AND Cluster-Head.Pr-DOS); 
   Prob. That the node is DOS intrusive ← Cluster-Head.Tr * Temp; 
  EndIf 
  If (Spoofing Detected) 
Temp ← (Cluster-Head.Pr-SP* Node(NodeId).Pr-SP/ Cluster-
Head.Tr AND Cluster-Head.Pr-SP); 
   Prob. That the node is Spoofing ← Cluster-Head.Tr * Temp; 




  If (Packet Misrouting Detected) 
Temp ← (Cluster-Head.Pr-PMR * Node(NodeId).Pr-PMR / 
Cluster-Head.Tr AND Cluster-Head.Pr-PMR); 
Prob That the node is misrouting packet ← Cluster-Head.Tr * 
Temp; 
  EndIf 
 } 
 SendDataToNeighbouringCluster(); 






 Cluster-Head ← GetClusterHead(NodeId); 
 NeighboringClusterHeads ← Cluster-Head.Neighbors; 
 PeerClusterHead ← InformPossibleAttack(NeighboringClusterHeads, Cluster-
Head); 
 
 If (DosAttackDetected) 
Temp1 ← (Cluster-Head.Tr  * Cluster-Head.Pr-DOS * 





Temp 2 ← PeerClusterHead.Tr  * PeerClusterHead.Pr-DOS * 
Node(NodeId).Pr-DOS / PeerClusterHead.Tr AND 
PeerClusterHead.Pr-DOS); 
   Prob. That the node is DOS intrusive ← Temp1 * Temp 2;  
  EndIf 
  If (Spoofing Detected) 
Temp1 ← (Cluster-Head.Tr  * Cluster-Head.Pr-SP * 
Node(NodeId).Pr- SP / Cluster-Head.Tr AND Cluster-Head.Pr- 
SP); 
Temp 2 ← PeerClusterHead.Tr  * PeerClusterHead.Pr- SP * 
Node(NodeId).Pr- SP / PeerClusterHead.Tr AND 
PeerClusterHead.Pr- SP); 
   Prob. That the node is SP intrusive ← Temp1 * Temp 2;  
 EndIf 
  If (Packet Misrouting Detected) 
Temp1 ← (Cluster-Head.Tr  * Cluster-Head.Pr-PMR * 
Node(NodeId).Pr- PMR / Cluster-Head.Tr AND Cluster-Head.Pr- 
PMR); 
Temp 2 ← PeerClusterHead.Tr  * PeerClusterHead.Pr- PMR * 
Node(NodeId).Pr- PMR / PeerClusterHead.Tr AND 
PeerClusterHead.Pr- PMR); 
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